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  This is unlike the presidential system, in which the chief is elected nationally by popular vote, and nominates his ministers, not required to be legislators, to form the cabinet. Senior positions in the cabinet, as also in the administration, are generally filled by the chief executive, i.e. the president, as obtains in the American model. All responsibilities for administration vest with the president, whereas the prime minister in a parliamentary form is primus inter pares i.e. 'number one among equals'. In the presidential form, the president is clearly the boss. It is popularly believed that the presidential model provides for greater flexibility in administration, allowing for quick responses by the executive without consulting the legislature. It is noteworthy that the Indian method has, over time, begun closely resembling the presidential system.

  This is true especially in states where the chief minister wields enormous powers, with nearly unlimited opportunities to issue directions, on every matter in the state's purview. His need to consult other political formations, or the permanent secretariat is relatively low. Over time, the Chief Minister's Office (CMO), in most states, has become the largest 'ministry' with enormous powers to overrule other departments, and to give specific directions to one and all. The alarming trend in recent years has been that such directions are frequently given orally, without formal written orders, and the recipient of the orders may disobey them at his peril. In effect, this has rendered much of the rest of the secretariat redundant.

  In a similar fashion, the rise of the special assistant and the personal office of the minister of the department in the Central Secretariat, has taken dominance over the regular secretariat. This has frequently sidelined the secretary, who hitherto was the principal adviser to the minister, and relegated him to a lower position. The minister's special assistant, or 'private secretary' as he is euphemistically called, carries more clout today in many ministries, than the formally appointed secretary of the department.

  Consultation of the political executive with the permanent executive, on a bottom-up basis, which was the hallmark of the parliamentary system, has now been replaced by specific directions emanating from the top, a feature of the presidential form. Indeed, the rise and expansion of the PMO, from the days of Indira Gandhi is the clearest indication that we are now in a presidential mode. There are small cells in the PMO today to connect with each ministry, call the shots in policy making, intervene on details – in short, the government machinery is micro-managed by the PMO. We have already seen this phenomenon in the states, where the CMO calls the shots in most matters, making most of the general secretariat redundant. This itself provides a serious logic for drastically curtailing the size of other ministries and getting the final decisions taken in the PMO or the CMO. Of course, depending on the nature and personal attributes and maturity of the protagonists, at different times the principal secretary to the prime minister or the cabinet secretary acted as 'chief coordinator' of the administration. Indeed the cabinet secretary once used to be the prime coordinator; this role has now effectively been taken over by the principal secretary to the prime minister. In other words, the US style 'chief of staff ' position held hitherto by the cabinet secretary has moved to the principal secretary to PM in recent years. The process of diminution and curtailment of voice of the permanent secretariat is now nearly complete.

  If the de facto change has contributed to a better decision-making process, nobody needs complain. However, the main trigger for this change, both at the Centre and at the state has been the desire, and the need of the political executive, not to be burdened by unnecessary and inconvenient advice, but to get unlimited freedom of action, frequently with not-so-legitimate objectives. Indeed the system as it has been transformed, has geared itself to receive the advice it wants! Rather than having the courage or ability to overrule unpleasant and inconvenient advice, how much simpler it is to redesign the advisory machinery, so that it spews out only desired advice! The purpose is to clear the ground so that the political executive positions itself to exploit the circumstances for personal or political benefit, monetary or otherwise, frequently both.

  This de facto change in the nature of our national management system, i.e. from a cabinet system to a presidential system is quite evident. We need to note, however, three aspects of this phenomenon. Firstly, this has happened almost surreptitiously, without a serious national debate. In other words, a major change in the spirit of the basic nature of the constitution has taken place in 'open daylight', within the Constitution and without overt public or parliamentary consent. Most insiders know that practically all chief ministers treat their cabinets as an irksome formality. No meaningful discussion or debate takes place in the cabinet, the approval of the cabinet is merely a rubber-stamp essential for meeting 'constitutional requirements'. Aren't Indians masters in keeping to the form scrupulously while 'substance' is sacrificed to convenience? Secondly, the presidential form requires that the chosen chief has the direct support of at least fifty percent of the nation's voters. In many states, with the temporary political marriages of convenience (elegantly termed coalitions), the chief minister may turn out to have the indirect backing of twenty-five or thirty percent of the vote, and still enjoy vast dictatorial powers. Finally, and most importantly, when major powers are conferred on an individual, it is imperative to have adequate checks and balances, which as we have seen, is not the case in India. A largely illiterate, apathetic electorate, with seventy percent living below or at poverty levels, a middle class which confines itself to arm-chair criticism of political issues without any direct participation, and an upper-crust which through sophisticated bribery controls the political class, is a dangerous amalgam in this context.

  A possible alternative to the current administrative setup is the formal establishment of the presidential form. Under this system, the head of administration is free to pick his chief executives and the next layer of implementers in the hierarchy from the open market – from universities, industry, the Legislature – anywhere. Thus, the prime minister will select his ministers to head ministries, keeping in view their competence, ability, probity, past record and likelihood of delivering the goods. The compulsion of having cabinet members exclusively from the Legislature will be given up. The political chief of each department would equally have the opportunity to choose the secretary of the department and even the next rung, for example, the special secretary, additional secretary, etc., from the open market based on experience, qualifications, and ability to perform. Such appointed persons, as in the USA, will have co-terminal tenures with the government in power. The permanent bureaucracy will be confined at the most to manning, say, posts up to the joint secretary level, though they may not be precluded from consideration for induction to higher levels, at the discretion of the political chief. Thus, we would have a meritocracy in each department at the political and senior-most levels to run the affairs of each department. A similar dispensation could be thought of at the state government levels also, using the same principles.

  This will surely improve the quality of administration. Those who come to take responsibility at the higher levels usually would be ones with a proven track record and would be keen to deliver results within five years. They would be answerable to none except the chief of the department, who is responsible to the elected chief of the government. Hire-and-fire will be part of the system, at the higher levels. This is a potentially sound alternative to the existing system where the political executive is filled mostly by thoroughly unqualified, frequently corrupt persons, whose only merit is that they have gone through an election. Similarly, members of the senior bureaucracy would not be eligible automatically for 'promotion' to higher echelons in administration; only the most able and the brightest would rise to very senior positions, and that too when they are relatively young and energetic. If we can envisage such a transformation, the overall impact on the quality of governance is likely to improve in the medium and long run.

  But we need to examine w
hether this is feasible. Will the legislator, at the Centre and at the state forego the 'inherent right' to become a minister? Will he allow such a constitutional change, cutting his own legs? If the president is popularly elected from all over the country, what are the chances that popular figures like actors Shahrukh Khan or Katrina Kaif or the Indian cricket captain M.S. Dhoni may not be elected to the post of executive president of India? On second thoughts, this may not be such a bad thing – they may perform more efficiently than the current crop that we see today! Again what are the checks and balances against this dispensation? How would one ensure that those who come into power for five years would not mortgage the future of the country, and leave it in much worse shape than when they came in? What will be the role of the legislature? There are a host of questions we need to address honestly without bringing group interest into play.

  I am not raising the question whether the Indian democracy should be in the 'parliamentary' or 'presidential' mode; I am merely pointing out the sea-change that has taken place gradually, imperceptibly but surely, steadily and deliberately. There has been no serious public debate on the pros and cons of which system is better for us; in other words, the political executive has ripped open the Constitution and transformed it without legal sanction. It is sad that there has been no one to question this.

  If India deserves a presidential form of government, so be it. Let us introduce it openly and deliberately. We need also, however, to build sufficient safeguards to ensure that any selected system is reasonably clean and has public interest as its foremost criterion. Ultimately, it may not even matter which system we use, so long as those who govern us are above board, are scrupulously clean and highly public spirited. Alas! currently this is not so; one would need a microscope to locate such elements either in the Central political executive and even worse, in the states. In a country, which leads the international league on corruption, it will be a naive person who expects things to be otherwise. Unfortunately, in these circumstances, checks and balances, in the Indian or any other context, is the only answer. The history of the Indian political executive has been to slowly but steadily and deliberately throw away all checks, to reach the situation that we are in, now. An effete Parliament and an unwilling judiciary are mere spectators; the civil service has lost its élan and ability to question the political executive, rather they have been silenced and the media has no stakes in the issue. Any thought of reform is possible only if the political executive accepts the need for reform and the establishment of checks and balances on its own actions.

  Coalition Politics – Why it makes governance difficult?

  The scenario described earlier has been compounded by successive unstable governments in the states, as well as the era of 'coalition politics' at the Centre. Chief ministers have had to appease segments of politicians, to ensure that from time-to-time small groups of supporting legislators do not tear away, compromising the safety of the government. This has sharply increased the bargaining powers of small and splinter groups. The tendency has been for small political formations to await their opportunity and exert leverage to obtain their rewards, so that specific groups are benefited.

  With a plethora of parties contending for each seat in most constituencies, the votes get divided; ultimately the winner in a particular constituency may have obtained as low as twenty-five percent of the total vote cast. Similarly, the ruling party in a state may have obtained only thirty percent of the popular vote, and yet command majority in the house, and claim to form government. It is another question whether some kind of 'transferable vote' needs to be introduced, to ensure that the final winner gets at least fifty percent of the total votes. Without going into this issue now, there is need to note that pre-poll alliances are entered into by parties to improve their chances, without regard to the thrust of their policies or public positions – there is no guarantee that such formations may not split after the results are out, depending on the circumstances of government formation. Similarly, unprincipled post-poll coalitions have been seen in many states, where the only objective is to obtain power, accompanied by all that it implies. Naturally, such alliances are highly unstable. There are no ready answers to such issues, except to note that the crass motivation of unprincipled politics may turn most citizens away from taking proper interest in politics or in governance – the long-term consequences can be quite negative.

  Apart from some of the direct deleterious effects on quality of governance, many other indirect negative contributions arise from the irrational induction of politics into governance. For instance, to keep elected representatives 'happy' and the flock intact at times of instability, the cabinets get 'expanded' with induction of more and more departments. Thus, unnecessary departments get created and an odd efficient cabinet minister gets saddled with unwanted deputies (who all clamour for a bite of the cake, and generally contribute to emaciate an already weak governance system).

  The Government Department or Ministry – the seat of power . . .

  The secretariat at the Centre or at the state capital consists of a number of ministries, each ministry comprising of one or more departments. Each department is assigned specific subjects for which it is responsible, under the 'Rules of Business'. These define specific areas of responsibility. Where a particular action, or policy covers more than one department, the cabinet assigns it to one of the departments as the coordinator. The Ministry of Finance at the Centre, for example, comprises the Departments of Revenue, Expenditure, Economic Affairs and Banking. Each ministry is usually in the charge of a cabinet minister, though sometimes even a minister of state, who is a member of the council of ministers but not of the cabinet, can be its head. Larger ministries could also be assigned one or more minister(s) of state, or a deputy minister or parliamentary secretary, all of whom are members of the council of ministers, to assist the minister in-charge.

  Each department is headed by a secretary, who reports directly to the minister concerned. Thus, three or four secretaries could report to one minister if the ministry is large; the minister decides who the coordinating secretary would be among these, as required, even though the specific subjects assigned to each department are clearly delineated. The secretary is assisted by a phalanx of officials – in descending hierarchical order, the special secretary, the additional secretary, the joint secretary, the director, the deputy secretary and the under secretary. The under secretary is the direct supervisor of one or more sections, each headed by a section officer, assisted by three or four officials. The secretary of the department assigns the specific duties to each of the officers under his charge, as well as to the various sections.

  Out of about two hundred officers of secretary rank in the Government of India, roughly half are from the IAS cadre, the others from Central services as well as experts in different fields, such as economics, applied sciences, statistics etc. Similarly, most of the officers are from the Central services or officers belonging to the secretariat services. The same pattern, as at the Centre with minor variations, as well as differences in terminology can be found in most states.

  In general, only officers of good quality get promoted to the level of secretary. The attrition rate at the joint secretary level for empanelment/posting in the Central Government is about fifty percent; thereafter, further attrition for higher selections is quite high. Thus, in a batch of hundred IAS officers, only five or six are likely to get finally empanelled for assignments as secretaries. In general, the quality of officers in the secretariats, both at the Centre and in the state governments is quite high. I am now familiar with the quality of personnel in private companies, even MNCs and I can say that the government personnel, man to man, are not inferior as compared to them. I can say this even at the risk of being charged with bias. Indeed, the sections, the lowest formation in each ministry, generally have high quality individuals manning them – the first time I went to Lucknow Secretariat, I was struck by the extremely high quality of the section officers and sect
ion officials; since then, even after postings in the Central Secretariat, I have had no occasion to change my views about the quality of the lowest level officials in the secretariat. Indeed, I could even say, only half-jokingly, that there is a greater variation in quality at the senior officer levels, than at the lowest levels. Many provincial civil service officers at the state, and Central secretariat officers in the Centre, who generally hold posts of under-secretary/deputy secretary/joint secretary, frequently can be seen to be of higher quality than their IAS or other Central service superiors.

  As mentioned earlier, the rules of business allocate the subjects for each department. These allocations are based on the government's perception of the management needs, and generally work fairly well. However, most real life issues or problems cut across the jurisdiction of many departments, and herein lies the rub. Thus, a programme for nutrition may involve the Department of Health, the Department of Women & Child Welfare, the Department of Education (for mid-day meal programmes), the Department of Food (fortification of, say, atta), Department of Industry (fortification of salt), etc. Clearly, nearly every subject that touches the common man would fall within the purview of three or four departments. Sadly, the levels of coordination among the departments are poor; most departments assiduously defend their 'turf ', without any thought to needs of coordination or quality of programme implementation. This is a fundamental reason why most government programmes, which appear very well conceived, logical and appropriate, fail at the implementation stage. Indeed there has been grossly inadequate attention given to issues of departmental coordination, and to ensure the citizen's one-point contact with the government in respect of each need. This is a basic aspect where governance, both at the Centre and the state has failed. The failure has to be attributed to poor coordination at senior echelons of the departments, dedicated 'turf ' guarding, utter callousness, and failure of ministers to devote attention to proper management of their departments. Recognition of the problem and concerted steps could rapidly mitigate this problem.