Goverment In India Read online

  The Directive Principles of State Policy enjoins the state to provide every citizen with means of adequate livelihood to prevent concentration of wealth, and to ensure equality of opportunity and the right to work. Amazingly, the Constitution makers had already recognised the critical role of nutrition, and had enjoined the state to ensure minimum levels of nutrition to the citizens. Suffice it to say that all the directions given to the state for conducting governance have not been heeded to, as we would see later. It is a pity that successive governments at the Centre and at the states have only given lip service, to the Constitution's directions regarding governance. The Judiciary, who are the arbiters of the provisions of the Constitution, has found it fit not to treat the directive principles as 'enforceable', which is arguably technically correct; they have also found it convenient not to delve into the spirit of the 'directive principles', which is a continuing national tragedy.

  In a democracy, the government is the managing arrangement created and mandated by the people in their own interest, to conduct governance, in consonance with the guidance given by the Constitution. The Constitution rests on three major pillars – the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the Executive. Apart from these, the Constitution has also created a number of agencies to assist in the process of governance; this is in addition to the large number of implementing agencies and institutions, created as part of the Executive. This book will examine the purpose for which each of these agencies was created under the Constitution, and will explore as to how and to what extent the expectations from these agencies or institutions have been fulfilled over the past sixty years.

  The role of the government and governance is frequently projected in terms of people versus government. Indeed, much of the litigation in the courts stems from this concept. In a sense, this is a contradiction in terms. The government, created by the people, is designed to help manage the problems of the people. At least in theory, there can be no people versus government issues in a democracy, since by definition the Executive is the creation of the people. However, it has been observed in all democracies, and not just in India, that the Executive develops a mind, spirit and attitude of its own over time, which need not always be pro-people or pro-citizen. In a democracy like India, with large segments of the electorate being poor and powerless, illiterate, ill-informed, and ill-organised, the Executive silences the voice of the people through subtle means and treats itself as being beyond accountability. These signals clearly point towards a very dangerous situation, and this is why correctives become called for.

  When a major illness strikes an individual, it manifests itself in different ways. Thus, a diabetic can easily develop eye problems, lack of coordination of limbs, and a host of other unfortunate manifestations in a very short period of time, all of these stemming from one root cause. That is why it is important to carefully diagnose the basic ailment afflicting the individual, as it is only then that a successful treatment can be attempted; addressing each local symptom in a piecemeal manner may lead nowhere. The book attempts to examine the symptoms, see how the various agencies have performed the tasks assigned to them, and diagnose if there is a common thread afflicting the Indian body-politic as a whole. Often, the diagnosis itself may lead to the cure – at times, the disease may have advanced so much, that even with the most accurate diagnosis, it may be too late for cure.

  If there is a minor hiccup in a well-run system, it may be possible to fix it by tweaking a nut here and fixing a bolt there. However, a diagnosis of our system of governance indicates that we have a creaking rundown machine, controlled by venal, selfish managers, alongwith major systemic problems. If we expect the machine to correct itself on its own, we would be seriously mistaken.

  When a patient is examined by the doctor, the focus is on those elements which function abnormally, i.e. the aches, the pains and other symptoms; a listing of everything that is normal is not stressed. Thus, in this book, the main focus has been on those administrative systems and aspects of governance that are malfunctioning, and thus, perhaps giving the book 'a negative' tone. There are enough recent publications talking about 'India Shining' or 'India the Greatest', and the like. It is said that if you want to get well, never lie to the doctor! This book is an earnest attempt at seeking a return of the body-politic to normal health, and therefore, is no less optimistic or positive in its inherent tone.

  One must note that the first stage is recognising the many parts that are malfunctioning; from there, one has to move on to diagnosing the problem accurately and systematically. This will have to be followed by a desire for cure, on a path to be determined, which needs to be pursued relentlessly for a certain period of time. If this sequence is not undertaken, the future is not just highly uncertain, but also likely to become a victim of the laws of nature that will stipulate a sudden and near-violent end, after much suffering.

  The author's opinion is that the disease is well advanced; however, it is not too late to make a serious attempt at curing it. In any case, a diagnosis has been made, through a microanalysis of the causal elements, and a macro-assessment of the major manifestations, in each sub-sector. It turns out that the diagnosis of the disease, reached through a careful process of examination, not surprisingly, is the same as suspected by the common man!

  1

  POLITICAL EXECUTIVE

  he Indian Constitution, modelled on the British parliamentary system, has entrusted the basic responsibility of executing the policies approved by the Legislature, and overseen by the Judiciary, to the Executive. The key role of governance and management of the country's affairs vests with the Executive, to whom all successes and failures of the same are attributed. The political executive is essentially akin to the board of directors in a large corporation, with functionaries, i.e. the permanent executive manning implementational positions at all levels. It is a vast machine with complicated internal structures.

  The Indian Constitution, by and large, follows the model of the British Constitution, and has also borrowed from the administrative systems of a number of other countries. It needs to be noted that there is no formally written British Constitution. It is essentially a body of past precedents, customary practices, and rulings by the House of Lords, that is referred to as the British Constitution. It is also worth mentioning, that till 1947, while Whitehall controlled Indian affairs from a remote distance, the responsibility for governance vested with the viceroy at the Centre, and the governors in the states. Thus, the secretaries of the various departments, usually from the Indian Civil Services (ICS) cadre, were practically the final authorities in their own departments; they would report to the chief secretary, who worked under the guidance of the governor. There was a fundamental change at the time of Independence, when each department came to be headed by a minister – a politician by definition. This completely changed the fundamental dynamics of the decision-making process within the ministry or department, and introduced a new major element in the administrative processes. Elsewhere, there is reference to the inability of our first leaders to comprehend the enormity of this change, who continued the same process of administration even after Independence, as if nothing had changed.

  The head of each ministry in the government of UK is designated 'secretary'. Thus, the secretary of the treasury, otherwise known as the chancellor of the exchequer, is the equivalent of the finance minister in our parlance; likewise, the home secretary in UK is the equivalent of our home minister, and so on. The equivalent of the Indian secretary to the department is designated 'permanent under-secretary' in UK. There is a significant difference in nomenclature designating senior positions in the two systems. This difference in terminology is not casual; it reflects the fundamentally different methods through which the mother country and the colony were governed. When the colony gained independence, this crucial difference was not taken note of in fashioning the administrative framework. The apparatus remained the same except for the superimposition of a political minister over a permanent secr
etariat, without consequential adjustments.

  Nominally, we are a parliamentary democracy. As per the 42nd Constitutional Amendment of 1976, we are also a 'Socialistic' Republic – a fact conveniently forgotten by policy makers in their obsession with growth, ignoring that a basic feature demands social justice as an inherent aspect of public policy! However, in practice, many features of a presidential system have surfaced, and have got integrated with our governance mechanism. For instance, the rise of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) in terms of power, prestige, and capability of intervention has been palpably in evidence since the 1980s. The office of the special assistant ruling the roost in the ministries, cutting into the legitimate domain of the secretary of the ministry, acting at the behest of the minister, is a case in point. In fact, it is a bizarre fact that real presidential powers in the country vest not with the chief executive, but with a party functionary! Again, the chief minister's secretariat is now supreme in most states, and the formally constituted machinery has been bypassed in most cases. To complicate matters further, we also have traces of the Mughal way of functioning which have crept into the system – the trusted henchman is allowed to do whatever he wants, so long as he shows loyalty and pays a tribute. All the above may not be accurately true everywhere; there may be a trace of exaggeration here and there, but these are unmistakable trends in our governance pattern. Bagehot is perfectly entitled to get confused about the system of governance that has evolved in India over the years; now, he would not be surprised by anything.

  In India, the Parliament is the supreme authority, and is the repository of the nation's sovereignty. The Executive, otherwise called the government, is the managing arrangement through which the people, in a social contract, organise the management of public affairs and implement the policies mandated through the election process. The government is thus, nothing but the implementing arm of the people. In theory at least, the citizen is supreme in a democracy. However, in democracies where the citizenry is unwary, and is unable or unwilling to impose its will on its government's activities, the executive tends to take a large measure of arbitrary power into its own hands. India evidently is one such country. On the other extreme, there are countries like Switzerland, where through regular cantonal elections and plebiscites, the people exercise their control over the Executive. Many of the Scandinavian countries have similar involved participation of the people on a large scale in the governance process. In countries like UK and USA, a relatively well-read, well-informed public is vigilant and watches over its own rights, in order to provide continuing constant guidance and direction to the Executive.

  Alas! India does not have these advantages. Democracy is alien to the spirit, temper and experience of Indians. For the past centuries, indeed millennia, India has been ruled by emperors and kings, many benevolent, and many others despotic; many of them have been seen by the people as of divine descent, with divine powers. (It would not be surprising if many of our current MPs, MLAs and ministers believe this to be true – their behaviour corresponds to this belief !) In fact, till very recently, the Nepal Naresh, who has now been unceremoniously dumped into the dung-heap of history, has been seen to be an avatar of Lord Vishnu. During the past five hundred years or so, both under the Mughals and the British, India was ruled with a strong arm, people in general having no say in how they were governed. In short, democracy is alien to the Indian 'genus'. An essentially feudal society, Indians respond to strong direction from authority; over time the citizens have not developed a sense of discipline and self control in their societal actions – an essential prerequisite for democratic temper.

  A cornerstone of the concept of democracy is the principle of 'checks and balances'. After centuries of struggle, the citizens of England tamed their monarchy, and brought in genuine democracy. A vigilant Parliament and strong public opinion, assisted by an enlightened media keeps the Executive in check – any excesses are quickly brought to light, frowned upon, and public opinion exerts itself. In the USA, the Congress and the Senate play a strong watchdog role – every mandate given, in general (except at the time of war), is subject to review and correction by layers of the House or Senate committees, which wield enormous operational powers. One has frequently seen the spectacle of the most powerful person in the world, viz., the president of US, stymied or frustrated in implementing his preferred policies by a recalcitrant Legislature. Every single major appointment, including that of ministers, is individually examined by the Legislature, grilled for suitability for the assignment, and only then confirmed. Mankind knew long back that 'power corrupts'; the founding fathers of the American constitution knew this well, and built a strong network of checks and balances within the system. As seen elsewhere, the Indian Legislature is toothless, the Judiciary unwilling to discipline the political class – they don't want their hands soiled and the Indian public is unable to exert pressure or keep a check on the activities of the Executive. Thus, the Indian executive is able to perform in an untrammelled manner, without any reasonable check on its actions, even when they are unbalanced, partisan, motivated or reckless.

  The India of 1947 or 1950 was a different kettle of fish from Britain. The experience, democratic temper, internal level of homogeneity in culture, language and social experience, the level of education and awareness of public affairs were far apart. However, an idealistic group of founding fathers, led by Nehru, had thought that transferring the British governance system to India mutatis mutandis, was the optimal prescription for ushering in and maintaining quality governance in India. This was thoroughly naïve. In British India, the viceroy and the senior functionaries (the ICS) enjoyed nearly untrammelled power; they were given a mandate, which they discharged indeed with extraordinary efficiency. Thus, apart from the guidance of the viceroy or the governor as the case may be, there was no immediate political supervision over the secretariat, district and field level functionaries. The strings of control from Whitehall had a long lead, and were rarely exercised. The district magistrate was the 'king of all he surveyed'. The internal checks and balances in that system came from the quality of the men who ruled India, the spirit of sacrifice and missionary zeal displayed by them.

  These fundamentals were lost on our founding fathers. The remote Whitehall control was replaced by immediate home-grown domestic control, at all levels from the tehsil to the district to the state secretariat, to Delhi. Nobody envisaged in 1950 that the local MLA will issue directions to the district magistrate (frequently for party politics or monetary considerations), or that sub-inspectors of police would be transferred and posted through a computer in the chief minister's office on the bidding of a local political gunda, who finds a particular functionary blocking his path. Suddenly, the rules of the game completely changed without notice, a whole new set of domestic politicians rose to the task of detailed micro-management and local control of the state apparatus, treating themselves as the direct operational bosses over the permanent executive. No doubt this phenomenon took about three decades to unfold, but the seeds were sown in 1950.

  The blunder of that time related to the absence of strong internal and external checks against the political class. Nehru, the idealist that he was, implicitly believed that all politicians would be in his image – selfless, devoted, self-sacrificing, public-spirited and noble. Contrast this with the way the founding fathers in US – the Washingtons, Jeffersons and the Franklins built in safeguards within the system, shrewdly recognising that vast powers given to members of the executive will lead to excesses, unless checked with controls at every step. This understanding of human nature is really what distinguishes the Western constitutions from what we have now in India. In the decades after Independence, the politician slowly started recognising his own inherent powers, and finding nothing to stop him, has turned into a greedy monster, gobbling up everything in the way.

  It is critically essential to understand this fundamental point before any reforms can be attempted. This failure of our founding fathers,
who otherwise gave us a fine document, is the fundamental basis of the difficulties the nation has been put through. Indeed, I surmise that if we had been adequately cautious in 1950, today India would be ranking with the best powers in the world in terms of strength of economy and polity. The only questions now are – can the political system be reformed? Can the political class reform itself ? Can it devise checks and balances to guide itself ? In the Indian experience, no institution has achieved excellence through self-criticism, self-regulation and ruthless adherence to standards. Even today the political class does not see the need for internal reform of politics – no political voice has been heard articulating this thought. This is the true measure of the nation's despair. This is also tragically the reason why the future seems bleak.

  Parliamentary or Presidential Democracy? To be or not to be…

  In form, we have a parliamentary democracy, patterned on the Westminster model. There is a cabinet with 'collective responsibility'. The majority party chooses its leader, who is also the leader of the government, from amongst the members elected to the Legislature. He in turn chooses his cabinet colleagues, and functions as the face of the government and the chief political executive.

  The cabinet is a sacred institution in a democracy which collectively takes all major decisions. There is room for debate in the cabinet before a decision is taken; however, every cabinet member is jointly and severally part of the decision, and cannot, even by implication, dissociate himself from the decision of which he was a part. Indeed, as per standing practice, the minutes of cabinet meetings are always terse and incorporate only the action points. In situations where some debate or disagreement surfaces, the minutes may mention, 'after discussion, it was decided. . . .' In case the disagreement was strong, the minutes may refer to 'after detailed discussion, it was decided . . .' In any case, all decisions are deemed to be unanimous. If any member of the cabinet has strong disagreement with the majority view on any matter, he cannot express it openly outside while continuing to be in the cabinet; his only choice is to resign, if he feels strongly enough. Once a decision is taken in the cabinet, no hint of lack of solidarity should be expected in a properly functioning system.